The Price of Spite in Spot-checking games
Please always quote using this URN: urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-52775
- We introduce the class of spot-checking games (SC games). These games model problems where the goal is to distribute fare inspectors over a toll network. Although SC games are not zero-sum, we show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed by linear programming. The computation of a strong Stackelberg equilibrium is more relevant for this problem, but we show that this is NP-hard. However, we give some bounds on the \emph{price of spite}, which measures how the payoff of the inspector degrades when committing to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate the quality of these bounds for a real-world application, namely the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways.
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| Author: | Guillaume Sagnol, Ralf BorndörferORCiD, Thomas Schlechte, Elmar Swarat |
|---|---|
| Document Type: | ZIB-Report |
| MSC-Classification: | 05-XX COMBINATORICS (For finite fields, see 11Txx) |
| 91-XX GAME THEORY, ECONOMICS, SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES | |
| Date of first Publication: | 2014/10/15 |
| Series (Serial Number): | ZIB-Report (14-38) |
| ISSN: | 1438-0064 |
| Published in: | Appeared in: 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'2014), as a brief announcement |
| DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8 |
