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Abstract (English)
This paper studies whether mergers may lead to partial tacit collusion, thereby having the potential to induce simultaneous coordinated and non-coordinated effects. We use a Bertrand-Edgeworth model with heterogeneous discount factors to derive conditions for profitable and stable collusion and provide a numerical example. Mergers that change the market structure in a way such that maverick firms are eliminated or colluding firms reach a critical share in total capacity can lead to partial collusion.
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Hohenheim discussion papers in business, economics and social sciences; 2019,15
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Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences
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Institute of Economics
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English
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330 Economics