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ResearchPaper
2009
Can international migration ever be made a Pareto improvement?
Can international migration ever be made a Pareto improvement?
Abstract (English)
We argue that compensating losers is more difficult for immigration than for trade and capital movements. While a tax-cum-subsidy mechanism allows the government to turn the gains from trade into a Pareto improvement, the same is not true for the so-called immigration surplus, if the redistributive mechanism is not allowed to discriminate against migrants. We discuss policy conclusions to be drawn from this fundamental asymmetry between migration and other forms of globalization.
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Hohenheimer Diskussionsbeiträge; 305
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Faculty
Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences
Institute
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (bis 2010)
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Language
English
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330 Economics