- AutorIn
- Fabian M. Teichmann
- Titel
- Eliminating bribery - an incentive-based approach
- Zitierfähige Url:
- https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa2-320483
- Quellenangabe
- Compliance Elliance Journal - 4 (2018),2, Cure or curse
Erscheinungsjahr: 2018
Jahrgang: 4
Heft: 2
Seiten: 72-78 - Erstveröffentlichung
- 2018
- Abstract (EN)
- This article discusses the potential role of incentive systems in combating bribery. In particular, it uses an agency theory approach to show how a combination of bonus and malus payments could help to eliminate bribery in multinational corporations. Expert interviews with 35 anti-bribery specialists from Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland were conducted and analyzed through qualitative content analysis. It was found that employees should be rewarded for both productivity and compliance. In addition, performance should be measured in a matrix and whistleblowers should receive a bonus for reporting undesired behavior. Conversely, significant risks associated with incentives for whistleblowing were also identified. Whilst the empirical findings focus on Europe, their implications could be applied globally.
- Freie Schlagwörter (DE)
- Compliance, Gesundheitswesen
- Freie Schlagwörter (EN)
- compliance, health care
- Klassifikation (DDC)
- 343
- Publizierende Institution
- Universität Leipzig, Leipzig
- University of Miami, Miami
- Version / Begutachtungsstatus
- angenommene Version / Postprint / Autorenversion
- URN Qucosa
- urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa2-320483
- Veröffentlichungsdatum Qucosa
- 26.10.2018
- Dokumenttyp
- Artikel
- Sprache des Dokumentes
- Englisch