Directly to content
  1. Publishing |
  2. Search |
  3. Browse |
  4. Recent items rss |
  5. Open Access |
  6. Jur. Issues |
  7. DeutschClear Cookie - decide language by browser settings

Does mutual knowledge of preferences lead to more equilibrium play? Experimental evidence

Brunner, Christoph ; Kauffeldt, T. Florian ; Rau, Hannes

[thumbnail of brunner_kauffeldt_rau_2017_dp629.pdf]
Preview
PDF, English
Download (594kB) | Terms of use

Citation of documents: Please do not cite the URL that is displayed in your browser location input, instead use the DOI, URN or the persistent URL below, as we can guarantee their long-time accessibility.

Abstract

In many experiments, the Nash equilibrium concept seems not to predict well. One reason may be that players have non-selfish preferences over outcomes. As a consequence, even when they are told what the material payoffs of the game are, mutual knowledge of preferences may not be satisfied. We experimentally examine several 2x2 games and test whether revealing players' preferences leads to more equilibrium play. For that purpose, we elicit subjects' preferences over outcomes before the games are played. It turns out that subjects are significantly more likely to play an equilibrium strategy when other players' preferences are revealed. We discuss a noisy version of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and a model of strategic ambiguity to account for observed subject behavior.

Document type: Working paper
Series Name: Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Volume: 0629
Place of Publication: Heidelberg
Date Deposited: 30 Jan 2017 13:38
Date: January 2017
Number of Pages: 47
Faculties / Institutes: The Faculty of Economics and Social Studies > Alfred-Weber-Institut for Economics
DDC-classification: 330 Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords: Behavioral Game Theory; Epistemic Game Theory; Nash Equilibrium, Games of Incomplete Information
Series: Discussion Paper Series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
About | FAQ | Contact | Imprint |
OA-LogoDINI certificate 2013Logo der Open-Archives-Initiative