Collective Risk Social Dilemma: Role of information availability in achieving cooperation against climate change

Abstract

Behaviour change via monetary investments is a way to fighting climate change. Prior research has investigated the role of climate-change investments using a Collective-Risk-Social-Dilemma (CRSD) game, where players have to collectively reach a target by contributing to a climate fund; failing which they lose their investments with a probability. However, little is known on how variability in the availability of information about players’ investments influences investment decisions in CRSD. In an experiment involving CRSD, 480 participants were randomly assigned to different conditions that differed in the availability of investment information among players. Half of the players possessed a higher starting endowment (rich) compared to other players (poor). Results revealed that investments against climate change were higher when investment information was available to all players compared to when this information was available only to a few players or to no one. Similarly, investments were higher among rich players compared to poor players when information was available among all players compared to when it was available only to a few players or to no one. Again, the average investment was significantly greater compared to the Nash investment when investment information was available to all players compared to when this information was available only to a few players or to no one. We highlight some implications of our laboratory experiment for human decision-making against climate change.