Do High Stakes and Competition Undermine Fair Behaviour? : Evidence from Russia

Fehr, Ernst; Tougareva, Elena; Fischbacher, Urs

Do High Stakes and Competition Undermine Fair Behaviour? : Evidence from Russia

Dateien

Fehr_0-270483.pdfGröße: 261.67 KBDownloads: 722

Datum

2014

Autor:innen

Fehr, Ernst

Tougareva, Elena

Fischbacher, Urs

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2014, 108, pp. 354-363. ISSN 0167-2681. eISSN 1879-1751. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.09.005

Zusammenfassung

This paper reports the results of a series of competitive labour market experiments in which subjects have the possibility to reciprocate favours. In the high stake condition subjects earned between two and three times their monthly income during the experiment. In the normal stake condition the stake level was reduced by a factor of ten. We observe that both in the high and the normal stake condition fairness concerns are strong enough to outweigh competitive forces and give rise to non-competitive wages. There is also no evidence that effort behaviour becomes generally more selfish at higher stake levels. Therefore, our results suggest that fairness concerns may play an important role even at relatively high stake levels.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Zitieren

ISO 690

FEHR, Ernst, Elena TOUGAREVA, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2014. Do High Stakes and Competition Undermine Fair Behaviour? : Evidence from Russia. In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2014, 108, pp. 354-363. ISSN 0167-2681. eISSN 1879-1751. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.09.005

BibTex

@article{Fehr2014Stake-30383,
  year={2014},
  doi={10.1016/j.jebo.2013.09.005},
  title={Do High Stakes and Competition Undermine Fair Behaviour? : Evidence from Russia},
  volume={108},
  issn={0167-2681},
  journal={Journal of  Economic Behavior and Organization},
  pages={354--363},
  author={Fehr, Ernst and Tougareva, Elena and Fischbacher, Urs}
}

RDF

<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/30383">
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-03-18T11:02:34Z</dcterms:available>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-03-18T11:02:34Z</dc:date>
    <dc:contributor>Tougareva, Elena</dc:contributor>
    <dc:contributor>Fehr, Ernst</dc:contributor>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/30383"/>
    <dc:creator>Fehr, Ernst</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This paper reports the results of a series of competitive labour market experiments in which subjects have the possibility to reciprocate favours. In the high stake condition subjects earned between two and three times their monthly income during the experiment. In the normal stake condition the stake level was reduced by a factor of ten. We observe that both in the high and the normal stake condition fairness concerns are strong enough to outweigh competitive forces and give rise to non-competitive wages. There is also no evidence that effort behaviour becomes generally more selfish at higher stake levels. Therefore, our results suggest that fairness concerns may play an important role even at relatively high stake levels.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/30383/3/Fehr_0-270483.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/30383/3/Fehr_0-270483.pdf"/>
    <dc:contributor>Fischbacher, Urs</dc:contributor>
    <dc:creator>Fischbacher, Urs</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:issued>2014</dcterms:issued>
    <dc:creator>Tougareva, Elena</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:title>Do High Stakes and Competition Undermine Fair Behaviour? : Evidence from Russia</dcterms:title>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Universitätsbibliographie

Ja