Does being Elected Increase Subjective Entitlements? : Evidence from the Laboratory

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2013
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Weiss, Arne Robert
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Zusammenfassung

In Geng, Weiss, and Woff (2011), we pointed to the possibility that a voting mechanism may create or strengthen an entitlement effect in political-power holders relative to a random-appointment mechanism. This comment documents that such an effect, if it exists, is not robust.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
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Elections, Electoral campaigns, Dictator game, Social distance, Entitle- ment, Experiment
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ISO 690WEISS, Arne Robert, Irenaeus WOLFF, 2013. Does being Elected Increase Subjective Entitlements? : Evidence from the Laboratory
BibTex
@techreport{Weiss2013being-29736,
  year={2013},
  series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics},
  title={Does being Elected Increase Subjective Entitlements? : Evidence from the Laboratory},
  number={2013-19},
  author={Weiss, Arne Robert and Wolff, Irenaeus}
}
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