@techreport{Eisenkopf2013Impac-29958,
  year={2013},
  series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics},
  title={The Impact of Management Incentives in Intergroup Contests},
  number={2013-26},
  author={Eisenkopf, Gerald}
}

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    <dcterms:title>The Impact of Management Incentives in Intergroup Contests</dcterms:title>
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    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">In intergroup contests a manager advises and motivates her group’s members. Her rewards often depend on the subsequent contest expenditure of the members. I test whether such incentives undermine the credibility and effectiveness of a manager’s efforts. In the different experimental treatments the managers either benefit from very high or low expenditure or get a predetermined payment. The results show that different management incentives shape the expenditure of the group members even if managers have an advisory role only. However, group members follow recommendations more closely if management compensation is not linked to contest expenditures.</dcterms:abstract>
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