Mandatory implicatures in Gricean pragmatics

Lauer, Sven

Mandatory implicatures in Gricean pragmatics

Dateien

Lauer_0-285306.pdfGröße: 220.36 KBDownloads: 508

Datum

2014

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Zukunftskolleg
Linguistik

Publikationstyp

Beitrag zu einem Konferenzband

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

DEGEN, Judith, ed., Michael FRANKE, ed., Noah D. GOODMAN, ed.. Proceedings of the Formal & Experimental Pragmatics Workshop. 2014, pp. 21-28

Zusammenfassung

Gricean implicatures are often viewed as a very weak kind of implication, viz., as optional enrichments of the literal meaning of an utterance. In virtue of being optional, they need not be present on every occasion of utterance, and they can be explicitly denied. Further, if implicatures are viewed as optional enrichments, a false implicature cannot be the reason why an utterance is infelicitous: If an implicature is known to be false, it should simply fail to arise. I argue that this view is mistaken. There is no reason to think that Gricean reasoning cannot lead to very robust inferences, which are neither optional nor cancelable, and whose falsity can render an utterance infelicitous. Moreover, I point out that a number of explicit recent theories do not exclude such robust implicatures without additional stipulation, and that informal appeal to Gricean reasoning triggering infelicity has been made in the investigation of a number of apparently semantic phenomena. I conclude that implicatures are only weak, optional and cancelable if the pragmatic pressures driving them are context-dependent in a particular way, and further that there is no reason to think that all pressures are of this kind.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

400 Sprachwissenschaft, Linguistik

Schlagwörter

implicature, optionality, cancelability, highnegation polar questions, maximize presupposition

Konferenz

Formal & Experimental Pragmatics Workshop, ESSLI 2014, 11. Aug. 2014 - 15. Aug. 2014, University of Tübingen

Zitieren

ISO 690

LAUER, Sven, 2014. Mandatory implicatures in Gricean pragmatics. Formal & Experimental Pragmatics Workshop, ESSLI 2014. University of Tübingen, 11. Aug. 2014 - 15. Aug. 2014. In: DEGEN, Judith, ed., Michael FRANKE, ed., Noah D. GOODMAN, ed.. Proceedings of the Formal & Experimental Pragmatics Workshop. 2014, pp. 21-28

BibTex

@inproceedings{Lauer2014Manda-31386,
  year={2014},
  title={Mandatory implicatures in Gricean pragmatics},
  url={https://sites.google.com/site/fepesslli2014/proceedings},
  booktitle={Proceedings of the Formal & Experimental Pragmatics Workshop},
  pages={21--28},
  editor={Degen, Judith and Franke, Michael and Goodman, Noah D.},
  author={Lauer, Sven}
}

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URL der Originalveröffentl.

https://sites.google.com/site/fepesslli2014/proceedings

Prüfdatum der URL

2015-03-31

Universitätsbibliographie

Ja