Boards : Independent and committed directors?

Volonté, Christophe

Boards : Independent and committed directors?

Dateien

Volonte_0-306622.pdfGröße: 254.42 KBDownloads: 325

Datum

2015

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

International Review of Law and Economics. 2015, 41, pp. 25-37. ISSN 0144-8188. eISSN 1873-6394. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.irle.2014.10.002

Zusammenfassung

Regulators, proxy advisors and shareholders are regularly calling for independent directors. However, at the same time, independent directors commonly engage in numerous outside activities potentially reducing their time and commitment with the particular firm. Using Tobin's Q as an approximation of market valuation and controlling for endogeneity, our empirical analysis reveals that neither is independence positively related to firm performance nor are outside activities negatively related to it. Nevertheless, we find that — non-independent — executive directors, former executives and family representatives have a positive relationship with Tobin's Q. Conversely, — independent — outside executives are negatively related with firm valuation. Moreover, the study indicates that the frequency and duration of meetings are negatively affected by the fraction of executive directors on the board. Insiders potentially reduce the need for meetings because of their specialist competence. The results therefore invalidate rules advocating independent directors and oppose the engagement of directors with significant outside activities.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Corporate governance; Board of directors; Board independence; Outside activities

Zitieren

ISO 690

VOLONTÉ, Christophe, 2015. Boards : Independent and committed directors?. In: International Review of Law and Economics. 2015, 41, pp. 25-37. ISSN 0144-8188. eISSN 1873-6394. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.irle.2014.10.002

BibTex

@article{Volonte2015Board-32126,
  year={2015},
  doi={10.1016/j.irle.2014.10.002},
  title={Boards : Independent and committed directors?},
  volume={41},
  issn={0144-8188},
  journal={International Review of Law and Economics},
  pages={25--37},
  author={Volonté, Christophe}
}

RDF

<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/32126">
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/32126/3/Volonte_0-306622.pdf"/>
    <dc:contributor>Volonté, Christophe</dc:contributor>
    <dc:creator>Volonté, Christophe</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2015</dcterms:issued>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/32126"/>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/32126/3/Volonte_0-306622.pdf"/>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-11-12T16:26:00Z</dcterms:available>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Regulators, proxy advisors and shareholders are regularly calling for independent directors. However, at the same time, independent directors commonly engage in numerous outside activities potentially reducing their time and commitment with the particular firm. Using Tobin's Q as an approximation of market valuation and controlling for endogeneity, our empirical analysis reveals that neither is independence positively related to firm performance nor are outside activities negatively related to it. Nevertheless, we find that — non-independent — executive directors, former executives and family representatives have a positive relationship with Tobin's Q. Conversely, — independent — outside executives are negatively related with firm valuation. Moreover, the study indicates that the frequency and duration of meetings are negatively affected by the fraction of executive directors on the board. Insiders potentially reduce the need for meetings because of their specialist competence. The results therefore invalidate rules advocating independent directors and oppose the engagement of directors with significant outside activities.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-11-12T16:26:00Z</dc:date>
    <dcterms:title>Boards : Independent and committed directors?</dcterms:title>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Universitätsbibliographie

Ja