Financial market misconduct and public enforcement : The case of Libor manipulation

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Gandhi_0-377205.pdf
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2016
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Gandhi, Priyank
Golez, Benjamin
Plazzi, Alberto
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Zusammenfassung

What is the role of public enforcement in preventing widespread financial market miscon- duct? We study this question using the events surrounding the manipulation of the London Interbank Offer Rate (Libor). We find pervasive evidence consistent with banks misreporting Libor submissions to profit from Libor-related positions in the full sample 1999-2012. The evidence is initially stronger for banks incorporated outside the U.S., where enforcement is historically weaker, and it disappears in the aftermath of Libor investigations. Overall, our results suggest that improvements in public enforcement can be effective in deterring financial market misconduct.

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Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
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Libor, manipulation, financial market misconduct, enforcement
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ISO 690GANDHI, Priyank, Benjamin GOLEZ, Jens JACKWERTH, Alberto PLAZZI, 2016. Financial market misconduct and public enforcement : The case of Libor manipulation
BibTex
@techreport{Gandhi2016Finan-36307,
  year={2016},
  title={Financial market misconduct and public enforcement : The case of Libor manipulation},
  author={Gandhi, Priyank and Golez, Benjamin and Jackwerth, Jens and Plazzi, Alberto},
  note={Earlier title was: 'Libor manipulation: Cui bono?'}
}
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Earlier title was: 'Libor manipulation: Cui bono?'
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