Voter uncertainty and failure of Duverger’s law : an empirical analysis

Herrmann, Michael

Voter uncertainty and failure of Duverger’s law : an empirical analysis

Dateien

herrmann_voter.pdfGröße: 32.54 MBDownloads: 746

Datum

2010

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaft

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Public Choice. 2010, 151(1-2), pp. 63-90. ISSN 0048-5829. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11127-010-9734-2

Zusammenfassung

Real-world simple plurality elections rarely bear out the strong Duvergerian prediction that, in equilibrium, only two competitors receive votes. Recent advances in strategic voting theory demonstrate that voter uncertainty about competitors’ true support levels in the constituency may lead to limited strategic voting, and hence incomplete desertion of trailing parties. This is the first attempt to estimate empirically the impact of uncertainty on incentives to vote strategically. Calibrating a model of strategic voting to voting results from simple plurality elections in German constituencies, it is found that strategic voters operate under high levels of uncertainty. These results support the proposition that uncertainty about party support impedes formation of Duvergerian equilibria.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

320 Politik

Schlagwörter

Strategic voting, Duverger’s law, uncertainty, voter information, incumbency, german elections

Zitieren

ISO 690

HERRMANN, Michael, 2010. Voter uncertainty and failure of Duverger’s law : an empirical analysis. In: Public Choice. 2010, 151(1-2), pp. 63-90. ISSN 0048-5829. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11127-010-9734-2

BibTex

@article{Herrmann2010Voter-14079,
  year={2010},
  doi={10.1007/s11127-010-9734-2},
  title={Voter uncertainty and failure of Duverger’s law : an empirical analysis},
  number={1-2},
  volume={151},
  issn={0048-5829},
  journal={Public Choice},
  pages={63--90},
  author={Herrmann, Michael}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

Ja