Strategic Reasoning in Hide-and-Seek Games : A Note

Heinrich, Timo; Wolff, Irenaeus

Strategic Reasoning in Hide-and-Seek Games : A Note

Dateien

TWI-RPS-074-Heinrich-Wolff-2012-03.pdfGröße: 758.55 KBDownloads: 608

Datum

2012

Autor:innen

Heinrich, Timo

Wolff, Irenaeus

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Working Paper/Technical Report

Publikationsstatus

Published

Zusammenfassung

Aggregate behavior in two-player hide-and-seek games deviates systematically from the mixed-strategy equilibrium prediction of assigning all actions equal probabilities (Rubinstein and Tversky, 1993, Rubinstein et al., 1996, Rubinstein, 1999). As Crawford and Iriberri (2007) point out, this deviation can be explained by strategic level- k reasoning. Here we provide empirical evidence that, indeed, it is non-equilibrium beliefs that lead to the behavior observed in the earlier studies: when a player's opponent is forced to play the equilibrium strategy, the player's choices are uniformly spread over the action space. At the same time, we nd robust evidence of an unexpected framing e ffect.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Salience, level-k reasoning, cognitive hierarchy, hide-and-seek game, framing effect

Zitieren

ISO 690

HEINRICH, Timo, Irenaeus WOLFF, 2012. Strategic Reasoning in Hide-and-Seek Games : A Note

BibTex

@techreport{Heinrich2012Strat-18877,
  year={2012},
  series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
  title={Strategic Reasoning in Hide-and-Seek Games : A Note},
  number={74},
  author={Heinrich, Timo and Wolff, Irenaeus}
}

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