Information Acquisition under (Im)perfect Data Privacy

Schudy, Simeon; Utikal, Verena

Information Acquisition under (Im)perfect Data Privacy

Dateien

TWI-RPS-076-Schudy-Utikal-2012-06.pdfGröße: 2.31 MBDownloads: 164

Datum

2012

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Working Paper/Technical Report

Publikationsstatus

Published

Zusammenfassung

We investigate the consequences of imperfect data privacy on information acquisition about personal health status. In a simplified game of persuasion players decide on whether or not to acquire information about their health status before searching for a matching partner (e.g. an insurance company). We contrast three institutional settings: automatic dissemination of certified test results, perfect data privacy and imperfect data privacy about certified test results (i.e. potentially involuntary dissemination). Assuming that the ex-ante expected payoff of a match with an unknown type is positive, we find that equilibria with complete information acquisition and complete information revelation exist only under perfect and imperfect data privacy whereas equilibria without any information acquisition exist under all institutional settings. We test our predictions in a laboratory experiment. Indeed, both imperfect and perfect data privacy yield almost perfect information acquisition. Automatic dissemination leads to incomplete information acquisition.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

data privacy, endogenous information acquisition, health, experiment

Zitieren

ISO 690

SCHUDY, Simeon, Verena UTIKAL, 2012. Information Acquisition under (Im)perfect Data Privacy

BibTex

@techreport{Schudy2012Infor-19476,
  year={2012},
  series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
  title={Information Acquisition under (Im)perfect Data Privacy},
  number={76},
  author={Schudy, Simeon and Utikal, Verena}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

Ja