Epistemic justification : its subjective and its objective ways

Spohn, Wolfgang

Epistemic justification : its subjective and its objective ways

Dateien

Spohn_2-1d7zx0v9r2we34.pdfGröße: 136.65 KBDownloads: 58

Datum

2018

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Synthese. 2018, 195(9), pp. 3837-3856. ISSN 0039-7857. eISSN 1573-0964. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1393-0

Zusammenfassung

Objective standards for justification or for being a reason would be desirable, but inductive skepticism tells us that they cannot be presupposed. Rather, we have to start from subjective-relative notions of justification and of being a reason. The paper lays out the strategic options we have given this dilemma. The paper explains the requirements for this subject-relative notion and how they may be satisfied. Then it discusses four quite heterogeneous ways of providing more objective standards, which combine without guaranteeing complete success.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

100 Philosophie

Schlagwörter

Epistemic reasons, Justification, Apriority, Objectivity, Pragmatic theory of truth, Rationality, Ranking theory

Zitieren

ISO 690

SPOHN, Wolfgang, 2018. Epistemic justification : its subjective and its objective ways. In: Synthese. 2018, 195(9), pp. 3837-3856. ISSN 0039-7857. eISSN 1573-0964. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1393-0

BibTex

@article{Spohn2018-09Epist-41360,
  year={2018},
  doi={10.1007/s11229-017-1393-0},
  title={Epistemic justification : its subjective and its objective ways},
  number={9},
  volume={195},
  issn={0039-7857},
  journal={Synthese},
  pages={3837--3856},
  author={Spohn, Wolfgang}
}

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