Ethnic Coalitions and the Logic of Political Survival in Authoritarian Regimes

Beiser, Janina; Metternich, Nils W.

Ethnic Coalitions and the Logic of Political Survival in Authoritarian Regimes

Dateien

Beiser-McGrath_2-1lpa7nraaricp7.pdfGröße: 446.34 KBDownloads: 224

Datum

2021

Autor:innen

Beiser, Janina

Metternich, Nils W.

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Hybrid

Sammlungen

Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaft

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Comparative Political Studies. Sage. 2021, 54(1), pp. 144-178. ISSN 0010-4140. eISSN 1552-3829. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0010414020920656

Zusammenfassung

Why do authoritarian governments exclude ethnic groups if this jeopardizes their regime survival? We generalize existing arguments that attribute exclusion dynamics to ethnic coalition formation. We argue that a mutual commitment problem, between the ethnic ruling group and potential coalition members, leads to power-balanced ethnic coalitions. However, authoritarian regimes with institutions that mitigate credible commitment problems facilitate the formation of coalitions that are less balanced in power. We test our arguments with a k-adic conditional logit approach, using data on ethnic groups and their power status. We demonstrate that in autocracies, the ruling ethnic group is more likely to form and maintain coalitions that balance population sizes among all coalition members. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the extent to which balancing occurs is conditional on authoritarian regime type.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

320 Politik

Schlagwörter

non-democratic regimes, conflict processes

Zitieren

ISO 690

BEISER, Janina, Nils W. METTERNICH, 2021. Ethnic Coalitions and the Logic of Political Survival in Authoritarian Regimes. In: Comparative Political Studies. Sage. 2021, 54(1), pp. 144-178. ISSN 0010-4140. eISSN 1552-3829. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0010414020920656

BibTex

@article{Beiser2021-01Ethni-50399,
  year={2021},
  doi={10.1177/0010414020920656},
  title={Ethnic Coalitions and the Logic of Political Survival in Authoritarian Regimes},
  number={1},
  volume={54},
  issn={0010-4140},
  journal={Comparative Political Studies},
  pages={144--178},
  author={Beiser, Janina and Metternich, Nils W.}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

Nein

Begutachtet

Ja