Evidence Production in Merger Control : The Role of Remedies

Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus; Wey, Christian

Evidence Production in Merger Control : The Role of Remedies

Dateien

Dertwinkel-Kalt_2-1wvglxklnw4j78.pdfGröße: 778.85 KBDownloads: 131

Datum

2021

Autor:innen

Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus

Wey, Christian

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Hybrid

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Review of Industrial Organization. Springer. 2021, 59(1), pp. 1-12. ISSN 0889-938X. eISSN 1573-7160. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11151-021-09813-2

Zusammenfassung

We analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system. The antitrust agency’s incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its action set. Allowing for a compromising remedy solution reduces information acquisition incentives, and could therefore reduce consumer welfare. The effort-frustrating effect of the remedy solution can be eliminated if a remedy solution can be implemented only after evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal has been produced.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Merger remedies, Merger control, Antitrust

Zitieren

ISO 690

DERTWINKEL-KALT, Markus, Christian WEY, 2021. Evidence Production in Merger Control : The Role of Remedies. In: Review of Industrial Organization. Springer. 2021, 59(1), pp. 1-12. ISSN 0889-938X. eISSN 1573-7160. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11151-021-09813-2

BibTex

@article{DertwinkelKalt2021-08Evide-53454,
  year={2021},
  doi={10.1007/s11151-021-09813-2},
  title={Evidence Production in Merger Control : The Role of Remedies},
  number={1},
  volume={59},
  issn={0889-938X},
  journal={Review of Industrial Organization},
  pages={1--12},
  author={Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus and Wey, Christian}
}

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