Morally Permissible Risk Imposition and Liability to Defensive Harm

Burri, Susanne

Morally Permissible Risk Imposition and Liability to Defensive Harm

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Datum

2020

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Hybrid

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Philosophie

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

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Published

Erschienen in

Law and Philosophy. Springer. 2020, 39(4), pp. 381-408. ISSN 0167-5249. eISSN 1573-0522. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s10982-019-09368-0

Zusammenfassung

This paper examines whether an agent becomes liable to defensive harm by engaging in a morally permissible but foreseeably risk-imposing activity that subsequently threatens objectively unjustified harm. It first clarifies the notion of a foreseeably risk-imposing activity by proposing that an activity should count as foreseeably risk-imposing if an agent may morally permissibly perform it only if she abides by certain duties of care. Those who argue that engaging in such an activity can render an agent liable to defensive harm ground this liability in the luck egalitarian thought that we may justly hold individuals responsible for the consequences of their voluntary choices. Against this, I argue that a luck egalitarian commitment to holding people responsible cannot, by itself, ground liability to defensive harm. It can help ground such liability only against the backdrop of a distributively just society, and only if further considerations speak morally in favour of attaching certain well-defined costs to individuals’ risk-imposing choices. I conclude by suggesting that if an account of liability applies robustly across distributively just and unjust contexts alike, then what grounds an agent’s liability is plausibly not her responsibility for threatening objectively unjustified harm, but her culpability for doing so.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

100 Philosophie

Zitieren

ISO 690

BURRI, Susanne, 2020. Morally Permissible Risk Imposition and Liability to Defensive Harm. In: Law and Philosophy. Springer. 2020, 39(4), pp. 381-408. ISSN 0167-5249. eISSN 1573-0522. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s10982-019-09368-0

BibTex

@article{Burri2020-08Moral-54182,
  year={2020},
  doi={10.1007/s10982-019-09368-0},
  title={Morally Permissible Risk Imposition and Liability to Defensive Harm},
  number={4},
  volume={39},
  issn={0167-5249},
  journal={Law and Philosophy},
  pages={381--408},
  author={Burri, Susanne}
}

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