Should central banks remain silent about their private information on cost-push shocks?

Hahn, Volker

Should central banks remain silent about their private information on cost-push shocks?

Dateien

hahn_215900.pdfGröße: 1.28 MBDownloads: 268

Datum

2011

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Oxford Economic Papers. 2011, 64(4), pp. 593-615. ISSN 0030-7653. eISSN 1464-3812. Available under: doi: 10.1093/oep/gpr056

Zusammenfassung

We propose a signalling model in which the central bank and firms receive information on cost-push shocks independently of each other. If the firms are rather unlikely to receive information directly, the central bank should remain silent about its own private information. If, however, firms are sufficiently likely to be informed, it is socially desirable for the central bank to reveal its own private information. By doing so, the central bank eliminates the distortions stemming from the signalling incentives under opacity. An ex ante transparency requirement can improve welfare even if central banks have the possibility to withhold information discretionarily. Moreover, our model may provide a rationale for the recent trend towards more transparency in monetary policy.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Zitieren

ISO 690

HAHN, Volker, 2011. Should central banks remain silent about their private information on cost-push shocks?. In: Oxford Economic Papers. 2011, 64(4), pp. 593-615. ISSN 0030-7653. eISSN 1464-3812. Available under: doi: 10.1093/oep/gpr056

BibTex

@article{Hahn2011Shoul-21590,
  year={2011},
  doi={10.1093/oep/gpr056},
  title={Should central banks remain silent about their private information on cost-push shocks?},
  number={4},
  volume={64},
  issn={0030-7653},
  journal={Oxford Economic Papers},
  pages={593--615},
  author={Hahn, Volker}
}

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