Transparency in Monetary Policy, Signaling, And Heterogeneous Information

Hahn, Volker

Transparency in Monetary Policy, Signaling, And Heterogeneous Information

Dateien

Hahn_246290.pdfGröße: 236.31 KBDownloads: 287

Datum

2013

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Macroeconomic Dynamics. 2013, 18(02), pp. 369-394. ISSN 1365-1005. eISSN 1469-8056. Available under: doi: 10.1017/S1365100512000429

Zusammenfassung

We examine the welfare implications of two types of central-bank transparency: the publication of the information underlying the central bank's decision (decision transparency) and the release of the information that the central bank observes afterwards (postdecision transparency). Decision transparency does not make the public better informed in equilibrium. Even so, it may be socially desirable because it eliminates harmful equilibria. Postdecision transparency has ambiguous effects. It reduces output variance and the distortions stemming from heterogeneous information. In this sense, it can be used as a substitute for monetary policy. However, postdecision transparency generally raises the variance of inflation. We argue that a conflict of interests may arise between society and the central bank with regard to transparency.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Zitieren

ISO 690

HAHN, Volker, 2013. Transparency in Monetary Policy, Signaling, And Heterogeneous Information. In: Macroeconomic Dynamics. 2013, 18(02), pp. 369-394. ISSN 1365-1005. eISSN 1469-8056. Available under: doi: 10.1017/S1365100512000429

BibTex

@article{Hahn2013Trans-24629,
  year={2013},
  doi={10.1017/S1365100512000429},
  title={Transparency in Monetary Policy, Signaling, And Heterogeneous Information},
  number={02},
  volume={18},
  issn={1365-1005},
  journal={Macroeconomic Dynamics},
  pages={369--394},
  author={Hahn, Volker}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

Ja