When best-replies are not in equilibrium : understanding cooperative behaviour

Wolff, Irenaeus

When best-replies are not in equilibrium : understanding cooperative behaviour

Dateien

Wolff_282403.pdfGröße: 1.45 MBDownloads: 174

Datum

2013

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Working Paper/Technical Report

Publikationsstatus

Published

Zusammenfassung

To understand cooperative behaviour in social-dilemma experiments, we need to understand the game participants play not only in monetary but in preference terms. Does a Nash-prediction based on participants’ actual preferences describe their behaviour in a public-good experiment well? And if not, where does the observed behaviour diverge from the prediction? This study provides an environment which allows to answer these questions: when making their contribution decision, participants are informed about their co-players’ priorly-elicited conditional-contribution preferences. This induces common knowledge of preferences and thereby leads to direct experimental control over the game participants play. Results show that most people play best-responses to their beliefs. At the same time, beliefs in a third of the cases do not correspond to an equilibrium prediction that is based on the elicited conditional-cooperation preferences. Moreover, more often than not, beliefs are empirically inaccurate. This holds true even in a treatment that gives participants the option to look up the set of equilibria of their game.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Zitieren

ISO 690

WOLFF, Irenaeus, 2013. When best-replies are not in equilibrium : understanding cooperative behaviour

BibTex

@techreport{Wolff2013bestr-28240,
  year={2013},
  series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
  title={When best-replies are not in equilibrium : understanding cooperative behaviour},
  number={88},
  author={Wolff, Irenaeus}
}

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