Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory : The Case of Risk Neutrality

Goldlücke, Susanne; Schmitz, Patrick W.

Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory : The Case of Risk Neutrality

Dateien

Ohlendorf_285650.pdfGröße: 484.89 KBDownloads: 744

Datum

2012

Autor:innen

Goldlücke, Susanne

Schmitz, Patrick W.

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

International Economic Review. 2012, 53(2), pp. 433-452. ISSN 0020-6598. eISSN 1468-2354. Available under: doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00687.x

Zusammenfassung

We consider a repeated moral hazard problem, where both the principal and the wealth-constrained agent are risk-neutral. In each of two periods, the agent can exert unobservable effort, leading to success or failure. Incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first period, so that the effort level induced in the second period is higher after a first-period success than after a failure. If renegotiation cannot be prevented, the principal may prefer a project with lower returns; i.e., a project may be "too good" to be financed or, similarly, an agent can be "overqualified".

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Dynamic moral hazard, hidden actions, limited liability

Zitieren

ISO 690

GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Patrick W. SCHMITZ, 2012. Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory : The Case of Risk Neutrality. In: International Economic Review. 2012, 53(2), pp. 433-452. ISSN 0020-6598. eISSN 1468-2354. Available under: doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00687.x

BibTex

@article{Goldlucke2012Repea-28565,
  year={2012},
  doi={10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00687.x},
  title={Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory : The Case of Risk Neutrality},
  number={2},
  volume={53},
  issn={0020-6598},
  journal={International Economic Review},
  pages={433--452},
  author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Schmitz, Patrick W.}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

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