On the Security of PAS (Predicate-Based Authentication Service)

Li, Shujun; Asghar, Hassan Jameel; Pieprzyk, Josef; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza; Schmitz, Roland; Wang, Huaxiong

On the Security of PAS (Predicate-Based Authentication Service)

Dateien

Li.1pdf.pdfGröße: 350.26 KBDownloads: 415

Datum

2009

Autor:innen

Li, Shujun

Asghar, Hassan Jameel

Pieprzyk, Josef

Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza

Schmitz, Roland

Wang, Huaxiong

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Informatik und Informationswissenschaft
Zukunftskolleg

Publikationstyp

Beitrag zu einem Konferenzband

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

2009 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference. IEEE, 2009, pp. 209-218. ISBN 978-0-7695-3919-5. Available under: doi: 10.1109/ACSAC.2009.27

Zusammenfassung

Recently a new human authentication scheme called PAS (predicate-based authentication service) was proposed, which does not require the assistance of any supplementary device. The main security claim of PAS is to resist passive adversaries who can observe the whole authentication session between the human user and the remote server. In this paper we show that PAS is insecure against both brute force attack and a probabilistic attack. In particular, we show that its security against brute force attack was strongly overestimated. Furthermore, we introduce a probabilistic attack, which can break part of the password even with a very small number of observed authentication sessions. Although the proposed attack cannot completely break the password, it can downgrade the PAS system to a much weaker system similar to common OTP (one-time password) systems.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

004 Informatik

Schlagwörter

authentication, Matsumoto-Imai threat model, attack, security, usability, OTP (one-time password)

Konferenz

2009 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), 7. Dez. 2009 - 11. Dez. 2009, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA

Zitieren

ISO 690

LI, Shujun, Hassan Jameel ASGHAR, Josef PIEPRZYK, Ahmad-Reza SADEGHI, Roland SCHMITZ, Huaxiong WANG, 2009. On the Security of PAS (Predicate-Based Authentication Service). 2009 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC). Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, 7. Dez. 2009 - 11. Dez. 2009. In: 2009 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference. IEEE, 2009, pp. 209-218. ISBN 978-0-7695-3919-5. Available under: doi: 10.1109/ACSAC.2009.27

BibTex

@inproceedings{Li2009-12Secur-5986,
  year={2009},
  doi={10.1109/ACSAC.2009.27},
  title={On the Security of PAS (Predicate-Based Authentication Service)},
  isbn={978-0-7695-3919-5},
  publisher={IEEE},
  booktitle={2009 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference},
  pages={209--218},
  author={Li, Shujun and Asghar, Hassan Jameel and Pieprzyk, Josef and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Schmitz, Roland and Wang, Huaxiong}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

Ja