Protectionist High-Flyers : Special Interest Politics in the Airline Industry of the European Union

Kraft, Christian

Protectionist High-Flyers : Special Interest Politics in the Airline Industry of the European Union

Dateien

ThesisKOPS.pdfGröße: 482.32 KBDownloads: 178

Datum

2003

Autor:innen

Kraft, Christian

URI (zitierfähiger Link)

http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-17813

Link zur Lizenz

Urheberrechtlich geschützt

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaft

Publikationstyp

Masterarbeit/Diplomarbeit

Publikationsstatus

Published

Zusammenfassung

This thesis argues that formal liberalization of service sectors is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for increased competition. Service providers demand and governments supply providers with a certain level of protection, particularly in the form of financial state aid. On the basis of rent seeking and collective action considerations I argue that the level of protection partly depends upon the political power of established providers who defend their dominant position against potential rivals. These considerations are directly applied to the air transport sector of the European Union and empirically tested by means of ordered logit regression models. The results support the theoretical expectation that protectionism and hence the gap between liberalization and competition prevails particularly in markets where governments and airlines are closely connected in terms of equity stakes and personnel.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Zentrales Argument dieser Diplomarbeit ist, dass die formale Liberalisierung von europäischen Dienstleistungsindustrien eine notwendige, jedoch keine hinreichende Bedingung für zunehmenden Wettbewerb zwischen den Anbietern darstellt. Stattdessen besteht weiterhin ein erhebliches Maß an Protektionismus, insbesondere mittels Subventionierung vormals staatlicher Anbieter. Vor dem Hintergrund von Rent-Seeking und Kollektivhandlungstheorien argumentiere ich, dass die politische Macht etablierter Anbieter das Ausmaß an Protektion beeinflusst. Der Luftverkehrsmarkt der Europäischen Union dient der Überprüfung dieser Zusammenhänge. Die Ergebnisse der logistischen Regressionen unterstützen die theoretisch Erwartung, dass Protektionismus und somit die Kluft zwischen formaler Liberalisierung und de facto Wettbewerb besonders in jenen EU Märkten fortbesteht, in denen Airlines und Regierungen durch Aktienanteile und personelle Verflechtungen eng miteinander verknüpft sind.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

320 Politik

Schlagwörter

Political Economy, Liberalization, Air Transport, State Aid, Lobbying

Zitieren

ISO 690

KRAFT, Christian, 2003. Protectionist High-Flyers : Special Interest Politics in the Airline Industry of the European Union [Master thesis]

BibTex

@mastersthesis{Kraft2003Prote-4297,
  year={2003},
  title={Protectionist High-Flyers : Special Interest Politics in the Airline Industry of the European Union},
  author={Kraft, Christian}
}

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