Tracking and Incentives: A comment on Hanushek and Woessmann

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TWI_Res_22.pdf
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2007
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Zusammenfassung

This paper discusses the incentive effect of tracking policies in education. The results contradict the argument by Hanushek and Woessmann (2006), that differences-in-differences estimations capture the full impact of tracking. Such estimations capture the gain in education between the measurements but neglect the gains before the first measurement. In a standard incentive theory framework these gains and their variance differ systematically between tracking and comprehensive systems. In a selective educational system, most students will provide more effort in early education. Signaling considerations enhance this line of argument. As a result, educational tests alone do not reveal the efficiency and distributional aspects of educational policies sufficiently.

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330 Wirtschaft
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Tracking, Selection, Educational Policy, Tracking, Selection
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ISO 690EISENKOPF, Gerald, 2007. Tracking and Incentives: A comment on Hanushek and Woessmann
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@techreport{Eisenkopf2007Track-11943,
  year={2007},
  series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
  title={Tracking and Incentives: A comment on Hanushek and Woessmann},
  number={22},
  author={Eisenkopf, Gerald}
}
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