The Core of Free Will

Spohn, Wolfgang

The Core of Free Will

Dateien

Spohn_2005_The_Core_of.pdfGröße: 275.6 KBDownloads: 282

Datum

2005

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Philosophie

Publikationstyp

Sonstiges, Konferenz

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Pittsburgh-Konstanz Colloquium VII

Zusammenfassung

The paper pleads for compatibilism by distinguishing the first-person's normative and the observer's empirical perspective. In the normative perspective one's own actions are uncaused and free, in the empirical perspective they are caused and may be predetermined. Still, there is only one notion of causation that is able to account for the relation between the causal conceptions within the two perspectives. The other main idea for explicating free will by explaining free actions or intentions as appropriately caused in a specified way is acknowledged, but not discussed. The paper finally argues that the normative and the empirical perspective are on a par; none is prior; even from within the empirical perspective the normative perspective is ineliminable.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

100 Philosophie

Zitieren

ISO 690

SPOHN, Wolfgang, 2005. The Core of Free Will. In: Pittsburgh-Konstanz Colloquium VII

BibTex

RDF

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Universitätsbibliographie

Ja