Bargaining Power in the European Union : An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models

Schneider, Gerald; Finke, Daniel; Bailer, Stefanie

Bargaining Power in the European Union : An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models

Dateien

politicalstudies_prepub.pdfGröße: 146.57 KBDownloads: 2020

Datum

2009

Autor:innen

Schneider, Gerald

Finke, Daniel

Bailer, Stefanie

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaft

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Political Studies. 2009, 57. Available under: doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x

Zusammenfassung

This paper evaluates, by drawing on Barry's distinction between 'power' and 'luck', the predictive accuracy of competing bargaining models. We explore whether models that take various facets of political power into account predict legislative outcomes more precisely than purely preference-based models like the Nash Bargaining solution (NBS). Our empirical examination compares how well different formal models predict the outcome of 66 legislative decisions made within the European Union (EU). A model that considers the saliency actors attach to a contested issue performs best among all the models under examination. Although resource-based models provide less accurate forecasts at the average, they offer relatively precise point predictions. The analysis also shows that domestic constraints are not a particularly important bargaining resource in legislative decision making.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

320 Politik

Schlagwörter

Europäische Union, Entscheidungsfindung, Spieltheorie, Nash-Verhandlungslösung, Evaluation von Theorien, European Union, Legislative Decision-Making, Council of Ministers, Spatial Models, Voting Power Indices, Nash Bargaining Solution, Prediction

Zitieren

ISO 690

SCHNEIDER, Gerald, Daniel FINKE, Stefanie BAILER, 2009. Bargaining Power in the European Union : An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models. In: Political Studies. 2009, 57. Available under: doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x

BibTex

@article{Schneider2009Barga-3910,
  year={2009},
  doi={10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x},
  title={Bargaining Power in the European Union : An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models},
  volume={57},
  journal={Political Studies},
  author={Schneider, Gerald and Finke, Daniel and Bailer, Stefanie}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

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