A partisan model of government expenditure

Bräuninger, Thomas

A partisan model of government expenditure

Dateien

A_partisan_model_Braeuninger_2005.pdfGröße: 299.86 KBDownloads: 562

Datum

2005

Autor:innen

Bräuninger, Thomas

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaft
Zukunftskolleg

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Public Choice. 2005, 125(3/4), pp. 409-429. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11127-005-3055-x

Zusammenfassung

Partisan models of budget politics largely concentrate on the size of government, budget deficits and debt, but most theories have little to say as to what the effect of party politics on both the size and the composition of budgets is. This paper seeks to extend previous literature in two directions. First, a model of spending preferences is developed that relates actors preferred level and allocation of expenditure to electoral gains from fiscal policies. Second, changes in both total expenditure and the expenditure mix of two budget categories are analyzed for the effect of parties spending preferences as stated in their election manifestos. Using data on 19 OECD countries from 1971 to 1999, the paper finds support for general partisan hypothesis. The results suggest that the actual spending preferences of parties matter whereas they do not indicate that parties of the left consistently differ from parties of the right in their spending behavior.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

320 Politik

Zitieren

ISO 690

BRÄUNINGER, Thomas, 2005. A partisan model of government expenditure. In: Public Choice. 2005, 125(3/4), pp. 409-429. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11127-005-3055-x

BibTex

@article{Brauninger2005parti-4060,
  year={2005},
  doi={10.1007/s11127-005-3055-x},
  title={A partisan model of government expenditure},
  number={3/4},
  volume={125},
  journal={Public Choice},
  pages={409--429},
  author={Bräuninger, Thomas}
}

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