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Abstract
The outcome of non-binding reverse auctions critically depends on how information is distributed during the bidding process. We use data from a large European procurement platform to study the impact of different information structures, specifically the availability of quality information to the bidders, on buyers' welfare and turnover of the platform. First we show that on the procurement platform considered bidders indeed are aware of their rivals' characteristics and the buyers preferences over those non-price characteristics. In a counterfactual analysis we then analyze the reduction of non-price information available to the bidders. As we find, platform turnovers in the period considered would decrease by around 30%, and the buyers' welfare would increase by the monetary equivalent of around 45% of turnover of the platform.
| Dokumententyp: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | Procurement, Bidding, Reverse Auctions, Multi-Attribute Auctions, Non-Binding Auctions, Information Disclosure, Structural Estimation |
| Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics |
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 300 Sozialwissenschaft, Soziologie
300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
| JEL Classification: | D44, D82, L11, L15 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13112-2 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Dokumenten ID: | 13112 |
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 21. Jun. 2012, 08:11 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 06. Nov. 2020, 10:38 |
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