586162429 dc bibtex

Questionable luxury taxes : results from a mating game / Tobias Thomas

Englisch

Hamburg : HSU Univ. d. Bundeswehr, Aug. 2008

Online Ressource (394 KB, Text) : graph. Darst.

Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader

Druckausg.: Thomas, Tobias *1975-*: Questionable luxury taxes. - Hamburg, 2008. - 22 S

URN: urn:nbn:de:gbv:705-opus-17176

Handle: 10419/38721

*Luxussteuer / Spieltheorie

Luxusgüter / Verbrauchsteuer / Konsumentenverhalten / Nachfrageinterdependenz / Signalling / Spieltheorie / Wohlfahrtsanalyse / Theorie

Arbeitspapier / Working paper / Graue Literatur / Non-commercial literature / Buch / Book / Online-Publikation / Online-publication

Journal of Economic Literature: C70

This contribution provides a game theoretical derivation of market demand as a function of the level and distribution of income in the considered economy: if (i) the price is low, everyone buys the good; if (ii ) the price is high, only the rich buy the good (a status good in a narrow sense). If (iii) the price is located in very high or in middle range, demand collapses. With this, we explain the critical price from which a status good acts as a distinctive signal. In addition, this approach shows the potential welfare-improving impact of conspicuous consumption. Taking these results into account, recommendations by numerous economists to prevent the welfare losses of conspicuous consumption by introducing a luxury tax are highly questionable. -- luxury tax ; conspicuous consumption ; mating model ; signaling game ; status good