662367480 dc bibtex

Monetary policy delegation and transparency of policy targets : a positive analysis / Kai Hielscher

Englisch

Hamburg : Helmut-Schmidt-Univ., 2011

Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 551 KB) : graph. Darst.

Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader

Druckausg.: Monetary policy delegation and transparency of policy targets. - Hamburg, 2011. - 27 S.

URN: urn:nbn:de:gbv:705-opus-29369

Handle: 10419/71090

Arbeitspapier / Working paper / Online-Publikation / Online-publication

Journal of Economic Literature: E52 ; E58

We show that, in a two-stage model of monetary policy with stochastic policy targets and asymmetric information, the transparency regime chosen by the central bank does never coincide with the regime preferred by society. Independent of society's endogenous choice of delegation, the central bank reveals its inflation target and conceals its output target. In contrast, society would prefer either transparency or opacity of both targets. As a conclusion, the choice of the transparency regime should be part of the optimal delegation solution. -- central banking ; monetary policy ; communication ; delegation ; positive analysis