On top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability
Dimitrov D (2005) Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics; 377.
Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Diskussionspapier
| Veröffentlicht | Englisch
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Dimitrov, Dinko
Abstract / Bemerkung
The top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) and the common ranking property of Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) are sufficient conditions for core stability in hedonic games. We introduce the semistrict core as a stronger stability concept than the core, and show that the top coalition property guarantees the existence of semistrictly core stable coalition structures. Moreover, for each game satisfying the common ranking property, the core and the semistrict core coincide.
Stichworte
Hedonic games;
Semistrict core;
Coalition formation;
Top coalition property;
Common ranking property
Erscheinungsjahr
2005
Serientitel
Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics
Band
377
ISSN
0931-6558
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2315463
Zitieren
Dimitrov D. On top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 377. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2005.
Dimitrov, D. (2005). On top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability (Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 377). Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Dimitrov, Dinko. 2005. On top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability. Vol. 377. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Dimitrov, D. (2005). On top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 377, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Dimitrov, D., 2005. On top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, no.377, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
D. Dimitrov, On top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, vol. 377, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2005.
Dimitrov, D.: On top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 377. Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld (2005).
Dimitrov, Dinko. On top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2005. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. 377.
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