Universität zu Köln

Alos-Ferrer, Carlos and Ritzberger, Klaus (2017). Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection? Games Econ. Behav., 103. S. 19 - 30. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473

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Abstract

In finite games subgame perfect equilibria are precisely those that are obtained by a backwards induction procedure. In large extensive form games with perfect information this equivalence does not hold: Strategy combinations fulfilling the backwards induction criterion may not be subgame perfect in general. The full equivalence is restored only under additional (topological) assumptions. This equivalence is in the form of a one-shot deviation principle for large games, which requires lower semi-continuous preferences. As corollaries we obtain one-shot deviation principles for particular classes of games, when each player moves only finitely often or when preferences are representable by payoff functions that are continuous at infinity. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Alos-Ferrer, Carlos UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Ritzberger, Klaus UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-233189
DOI:	10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.005
Journal or Publication Title:	Games Econ. Behav.
Volume:	103
Page Range:	S. 19 - 30
Date:	2017
Publisher:	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Place of Publication:	SAN DIEGO
ISSN:	1090-2473
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES; EQUILIBRIUM; INFORMATION; EXISTENCE; MODEL Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/23318