Universität zu Köln

Alos-Ferrer, Carlos and Ritzberger, Klaus (2017). Characterizing existence of equilibrium for large extensive form games: a necessity result. Econ. Theory, 63 (2). S. 407 - 431. NEW YORK: SPRINGER. ISSN 1432-0479

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Abstract

What is the minimal structure that is needed to perform equilibrium analysis in large extensive form games? To answer this question, this paper provides conditions that are simultaneously necessary and sufficient for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in any well-behaved perfect information game defined on a large game tree. In particular, the set of plays needs to be endowed with a topology satisfying two conditions. (a) Nodes are closed as sets of plays; and (b) the immediate predecessor function is an open map.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Alos-Ferrer, Carlos UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Ritzberger, Klaus UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-241616
DOI:	10.1007/s00199-015-0937-0
Journal or Publication Title:	Econ. Theory
Volume:	63
Number:	2
Page Range:	S. 407 - 431
Date:	2017
Publisher:	SPRINGER
Place of Publication:	NEW YORK
ISSN:	1432-0479
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language PERFECT-INFORMATION GAMES; SEMICONTINUOUS PAYOFFS Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/24161