Universität zu Köln

Granic, Dura-Georg and Kern, Johannes (2016). Circulant games. Theory Decis., 80 (1). S. 43 - 70. DORDRECHT: SPRINGER. ISSN 1573-7187

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Abstract

We study a class of two-player normal-form games with cyclical payoff structures. A game is called circulant if both players' payoff matrices fulfill a rotational symmetry condition. The class of circulant games contains well-known examples such as Matching Pennies, Rock-Paper-Scissors, as well as subclasses of coordination and common interest games. The best response correspondences in circulant games induce a partition on each player's set of pure strategies into equivalence classes. In any Nash Equilibrium, all strategies within one class are either played with strictly positive or with zero probability. We further show that, strikingly, a single parameter fully determines the exact number and the structure of all Nash equilibria (pure and mixed) in these games. The parameter itself only depends on the position of the largest payoff in the first row of one of the player's payoff matrix.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Granic, Dura-Georg UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Kern, Johannes UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-291631
DOI:	10.1007/s11238-014-9478-4
Journal or Publication Title:	Theory Decis.
Volume:	80
Number:	1
Page Range:	S. 43 - 70
Date:	2016
Publisher:	SPRINGER
Place of Publication:	DORDRECHT
ISSN:	1573-7187
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language ROCK-PAPER-SCISSORS; NASH EQUILIBRIA; FOCAL POINTS; BIMATRIX GAMES; MAXIMAL NUMBER; STRATEGIES; EVOLUTION Multiple languages Economics; Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/29163