Universität zu Köln

Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W. . How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects*. Scand. J. Econ.. HOBOKEN: WILEY. ISSN 1467-9442

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Abstract

The government wants an infrastructure-based public service to be provided. First, the infrastructure has to be built; subsequently, it has to be operated. Should the government bundle the building and operating tasks in a public-private partnership? Or should it choose traditional procurement (i.e., delegate the tasks to different firms)? Each task entails unobservable investments to come up with innovations. It turns out that, depending on the nature of the innovations, bundling can either stimulate or discourage investments. Moreover, we find that if renegotiation cannot be prevented, public-private partnerships might lead the government to deliberately opt for technologically inferior projects.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Hoppe, Eva I. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Schmitz, Patrick W. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-322374
DOI:	10.1111/sjoe.12393
Journal or Publication Title:	Scand. J. Econ.
Publisher:	WILEY
Place of Publication:	HOBOKEN
ISSN:	1467-9442
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS; LIMITED-LIABILITY; MORAL HAZARD; DELIVERING INNOVATION; INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS; OWNERSHIP; RENEGOTIATION; INCENTIVES; MANAGEMENT; FACILITIES Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/32237