Sauermann, Jan ORCID: 0000-0002-7673-6407 (2020). On the instability of majority decision-making: testing the implications of the 'chaos theorems' in a laboratory experiment. Theory Decis., 88 (4). S. 505 - 527. DORDRECHT: SPRINGER. ISSN 1573-7187

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Abstract

In light of the so-called 'chaos theorems' from social choice theory, William Riker (W. H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco, 1982) argues that the indeterminacy of majority rule leads to voting cycles making democratic decisions arbitrary and meaningless. Moreover, when the core is empty, majority instability correlates with the level of conflict among actors. This study uses laboratory committee decision-making experiments to provide an empirical test of both aspects of Riker's argument. Committees make repeated majority decisions over 20 periods picking points from a two-dimensional policy space. The experiment manipulates committee members' preferences and thus varies the existence of a core and the level of conflict between group members. The experimental results contradict Riker's interpretation of the chaos theorems' implications. Thus, the core exhibits less attraction than generally assumed. Moreover, an empty core is not associated with increased majority rule instability. Instead, conflicting preferences lead to more instability irrespective of the existence of an equilibrium.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Sauermann, JanUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0002-7673-6407UNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-335619
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-019-09741-4
Journal or Publication Title: Theory Decis.
Volume: 88
Number: 4
Page Range: S. 505 - 527
Date: 2020
Publisher: SPRINGER
Place of Publication: DORDRECHT
ISSN: 1573-7187
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
DISTRIBUTIONAL FAIRNESS; RULE; EQUILIBRIUM; INTRANSITIVITIES; GAMESMultiple languages
Economics; Social Sciences, Mathematical MethodsMultiple languages
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/33561

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