Universität zu Köln

Mueller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2015). Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted. Econ. Lett., 129. S. 116 - 121. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

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Abstract

When penalties for first-time offenders are restricted, it is typically optimal for the lawmaker to overdeter repeat offenders. First-time offenders are then deterred not only by the (restricted) fine for a first offense, but also by the prospect of a large fine for a subsequent offense. Now suppose therestriction on penalties for first-time offenders is relaxed; i.e., larger fines for a first offense become enforceable. Should overdeterrence of repeat offenders now be reduced? We show that this is the case only if the original restriction was not very strong. Otherwise, overdeterrence of repeat offenders should actually be further amplified. (C) 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Mueller, Daniel UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Schmitz, Patrick W. UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-3461-5102 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-403239
DOI:	10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.010
Journal or Publication Title:	Econ. Lett.
Volume:	129
Page Range:	S. 116 - 121
Date:	2015
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Place of Publication:	LAUSANNE
ISSN:	1873-7374
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language DESIGN Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/40323