Universität zu Köln

Beck, Adrian, Kerschbamer, Rudolf ORCID: 0000-0002-7666-7157, Qiu, Jianying and Sutter, Matthias ORCID: 0000-0002-6143-8706 (2014). Car mechanics in the lab--Investigating the behavior of real experts on experimental markets for credence goods. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 108. S. 166 - 174. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1879-1751

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Abstract

Credence goods, such as car repairs or medical services, are characterized by severe informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers, leading to fraud in the form of provision of insufficient service (undertreatment), provision of unnecessary service (overtreatment) and charging too much for a given service (overcharging). Recent experimental research involving a standard (student) subject pool has examined the influence of informational and market conditions on the type and level of fraud. We investigate whether professional car mechanics - as real sellers of credence goods - react in the same way to changes in informational and institutional constraints. While we find qualitatively similar effects in the fraud dimensions of undertreatment and overcharging for both subject pools, car mechanics are significantly more prone to supplying unnecessary services in all conditions, which could be a result of decision heuristics they learned in their professional training. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Beck, Adrian UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Kerschbamer, Rudolf UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-7666-7157 UNSPECIFIED Qiu, Jianying UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Sutter, Matthias UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-6143-8706 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-422562
DOI:	10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.008
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Behav. Organ.
Volume:	108
Page Range:	S. 166 - 174
Date:	2014
Publisher:	ELSEVIER
Place of Publication:	AMSTERDAM
ISSN:	1879-1751
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language FIELD EXPERIMENT; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; INCENTIVES; REPUTATION; ECONOMICS Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/42256