Schmitz, Patrick W. (2014). Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered. Econ. Lett., 125 (1). S. 21 - 25. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

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Abstract

Consider a non-governmental organization (NGO) that can invest in a public good. Should the government or the NGO own the public project? In an incomplete contracting framework with split-the-difference bargaining, Besley and Ghatak (2001) argue that the party who values the public good most should be the owner. We demonstrate the robustness of their insight when the split-the-difference rule is replaced by the deal-me-out solution. Our finding is in contrast to the private good results of Chiu (1998) and De Meza and Lockwood (1998), who show that the optimal ownership structure crucially depends on whether the split-the-difference rule or the deal-me-out solution is used. (C) 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Schmitz, Patrick W.UNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-426533
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.08.003
Journal or Publication Title: Econ. Lett.
Volume: 125
Number: 1
Page Range: S. 21 - 25
Date: 2014
Publisher: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Place of Publication: LAUSANNE
ISSN: 1873-7374
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
PROPERTY-RIGHTS THEORY; INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS; ASSET OWNERSHIP; FIRM; GOVERNMENT; OPTION; COSTSMultiple languages
EconomicsMultiple languages
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/42653

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