Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2021). Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information. J. Public Econ., 198. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0047-2727

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Abstract

Consider two parties who can make non-contractible investments in the provision of a public good. Who should own the physical assets needed to provide the public good? In the literature it has been argued that the party who values the public good most should be the owner, regardless of the investment technologies. Yet, this result has been derived under the assumption of symmetric information. We show that technology matters when the negotiations over the provision of the public good take place under asymmetric information. If party A has a better investment technology, ownership by party A can be optimal even when party B has a larger expected valuation of the public good. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Schmitz, Patrick W.UNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0003-3461-5102UNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-572407
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104424
Journal or Publication Title: J. Public Econ.
Volume: 198
Date: 2021
Publisher: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Place of Publication: LAUSANNE
ISSN: 0047-2727
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS; INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS; EFFICIENT MECHANISMS; OPTIMAL ALLOCATION; TRANSACTION COSTS; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; INCENTIVES; GOVERNMENT; FIRM; INFRASTRUCTUREMultiple languages
EconomicsMultiple languages
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/57240

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