Four Essays in Economic Theory
Four Essays in Economic Theory
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DissertationPrüfungsdatum
13.06.2013Datum der Veröffentlichung
10.07.2013Erstgutachter
Moldovanu, BennyZweitgutachter
Szalay, DezsöMetadaten
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Inhalt
This thesis comprises four essays that belong to different strands of the theoretical economic literature. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 study two-sided one-to-one matching markets with quasi-linear utility and multi-dimensional heterogeneity. Chapter 1 investigates the efficiency properties of two-sided investments and in particular the sources and limitations of potential investment coordination failures in large two-sided economies with competitive post-investment market. Chapter 2 scrutinizes a novel two-sided matching model with a finite number of agents and two-sided private information about exogenously given attributes. Chapter 3 is a note on the optimal size of fixed-prize research tournaments that seeks to fill two important gaps in an influential paper by Fullerton and McAfee (1999), and Chapter 4 studies the impact of incomplete information on the problem of maximizing revenue in a dynamic version of the knapsack problem, which is a classical combinatorial resource allocation problem with numerous economic applications.
Schlagwörter
Matching, Mechanismusdesign, Zweiseitiger Markt, Multidimensional, Investition, Asymmetrische Information, Rucksackproblem, Operations Research, mechanism design, two-sided market, multi-dimensional, investment, asymmetric information, knapsack problem
Klassifikation (DDC)
330 WirtschaftDizdar, Deniz: Four Essays in Economic Theory. - Bonn, 2013. - Dissertation, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn.
Online-Ausgabe in bonndoc: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-32633
Online-Ausgabe in bonndoc: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-32633
@phdthesis{handle:20.500.11811/5434,
urn: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-32633,
author = {{Deniz Dizdar}},
title = {Four Essays in Economic Theory},
school = {Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn},
year = 2013,
month = jul,
note = {This thesis comprises four essays that belong to different strands of the theoretical economic literature. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 study two-sided one-to-one matching markets with quasi-linear utility and multi-dimensional heterogeneity. Chapter 1 investigates the efficiency properties of two-sided investments and in particular the sources and limitations of potential investment coordination failures in large two-sided economies with competitive post-investment market. Chapter 2 scrutinizes a novel two-sided matching model with a finite number of agents and two-sided private information about exogenously given attributes. Chapter 3 is a note on the optimal size of fixed-prize research tournaments that seeks to fill two important gaps in an influential paper by Fullerton and McAfee (1999), and Chapter 4 studies the impact of incomplete information on the problem of maximizing revenue in a dynamic version of the knapsack problem, which is a classical combinatorial resource allocation problem with numerous economic applications.},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/5434}
}
urn: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-32633,
author = {{Deniz Dizdar}},
title = {Four Essays in Economic Theory},
school = {Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn},
year = 2013,
month = jul,
note = {This thesis comprises four essays that belong to different strands of the theoretical economic literature. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 study two-sided one-to-one matching markets with quasi-linear utility and multi-dimensional heterogeneity. Chapter 1 investigates the efficiency properties of two-sided investments and in particular the sources and limitations of potential investment coordination failures in large two-sided economies with competitive post-investment market. Chapter 2 scrutinizes a novel two-sided matching model with a finite number of agents and two-sided private information about exogenously given attributes. Chapter 3 is a note on the optimal size of fixed-prize research tournaments that seeks to fill two important gaps in an influential paper by Fullerton and McAfee (1999), and Chapter 4 studies the impact of incomplete information on the problem of maximizing revenue in a dynamic version of the knapsack problem, which is a classical combinatorial resource allocation problem with numerous economic applications.},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/5434}
}
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