Strategic transparency and electoral pressure
- This paper investigates how an office-motivated incumbent can use transparency enhancement on public spending to signal his budgetary management ability and win re-election. We show that when the incumbent faces a popular challenger, transparency policy can be an effective signaling device. A more popular challenger can reduce the probability to enhance transparency, while voters can be better off due to a more informative signaling. It is also shown that a higher level of public interest in fiscal issues can increase the probability of enhancing transparency, while voters can be worse off by a less informative signaling.
| Author: | Laura Moretti, Toru Suzuki |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-286340 |
| Parent Title (German): | Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2012,19 |
| Series (Serial Number): | CFS working paper series (2012, 19) |
| Publisher: | Center for Financial Studies |
| Place of publication: | Frankfurt, M. |
| Document Type: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Year of Completion: | 2012 |
| Year of first Publication: | 2012 |
| Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
| Release Date: | 2013/02/04 |
| Tag: | Electoral Pressure; Fiscal Transparency; Perfect Sequential Equilibrium; Signaling Game |
| Issue: | Version 4 December 2012 |
| Page Number: | 25 |
| HeBIS-PPN: | 328037966 |
| Institutes: | Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS) |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 32 Politikwissenschaft / 320 Politikwissenschaft |
| 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft | |
| Sammlungen: | Universitätspublikationen |
| Licence (German): |  Deutsches Urheberrecht |
