Game-theoretic foundations of monetary equilibrium : [Version 30 September 2013]
- Monetary theorists have advanced an intriguing notion: we exchange money to make up for a lack of enforcement, when it is difficult to monitor and sanction opportunistic behaviors. We demonstrate that, in fact, monetary equilibrium cannot generally be sustained when monitoring and punishment limitations preclude enforcement — external or not. Simply put, monetary systems cannot operate independently of institutions — formal or informal — designed to monitor behaviors and sanction undesirable ones. This fundamental result is derived by integrating monetary theory with the theory of repeated games, studying monetary equilibrium as the outcome of a matching game with private monitoring.
| Author: | Gabriele Camera, Alessandro Gioffré |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-317888 |
| URL: | http://ssrn.com/abstract=2334192 |
| DOI: | https://doi.org/kommt noc |
| Parent Title (German): | SAFE working paper series ; No. 32 |
| Series (Serial Number): | SAFE working paper (32) |
| Publisher: | SAFE |
| Place of publication: | Frankfurt am Main |
| Document Type: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Year of Completion: | 2013 |
| Year of first Publication: | 2013 |
| Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
| Release Date: | 2013/10/10 |
| Tag: | cooperation; payment systems; repeated games; social norms |
| Issue: | Version 30 September 2013 |
| Page Number: | 34 |
| First Page: | 1 |
| Last Page: | 31 |
| HeBIS-PPN: | 348854293 |
| Institutes: | Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE) | |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
| Sammlungen: | Universitätspublikationen |
| Licence (German): |  Deutsches Urheberrecht |
