Financial disclosure and market transparency with costly information processing

  • We study a model where some investors ("hedgers") are bad at information processing, while others ("speculators") have superior information-processing ability and trade purely to exploit it. The disclosure of financial information induces a trade externality: if speculators refrain from trading, hedgers do the same, depressing the asset price. Market transparency reinforces this mechanism, by making speculators' trades more visible to hedgers. As a consequence, issuers will oppose both the disclosure of fundamentals and trading transparency. Issuers may either under- or over-provide information compared to the socially efficient level if speculators have more bargaining power than hedgers, while they never under-provide it otherwise. When hedgers have low financial literacy, forbidding their access to the market may be socially efficient.

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Metadaten
Author:Marco Di Maggio, Marco Pagano
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-353087
URL:http://ssrn.com/abstract=2517287
Parent Title (English):Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 485
Series (Serial Number):CFS working paper series (485)
Publisher:Center for Financial Studies
Place of publication:Frankfurt, M.
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Year of Completion:2014
Year of first Publication:2014
Publishing Institution:Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2014/11/03
Tag:OTC markets; disclosure; financial literacy; limited attention; transparency
Issue:August 18, 2014
Page Number:58
HeBIS-PPN:351017305
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Licence (German):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht