Property rights and resource allocation in an overlapping generations model

  • The paper is an enquiry into dynamic social contract theory. The social contract defines the rules of resource use. An intergenerational social contract in an economy with a single exhaustible resource is examined within a framework of an overlapping generations model. It is assumed that new generations do not accept the old social contract, and access to resources will be renegotiated between any incumbent generation and their successors. It turns out that later generations will be in an unfortunate position regardless of their bargaining power.

Download full text files

Export metadata

Additional Services

Search Google Scholar Statistics
Metadaten
Author details:Hans-Peter Weikard
URN:urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-8543
Publication series (Volume number):Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge (Bd. 17)
Publication type:Monograph/Edited Volume
Language:English
Publication year:1997
Publishing institution:Universität Potsdam
Release date:2006/09/12
Source:Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge ; 17 / Lehrstuhl für Finanzwissenschaft, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät der Universität Potsdam
RVK - Regensburg classification:QL 000
Organizational units:Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
DDC classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Accept ✔
This website uses technically necessary session cookies. By continuing to use the website, you agree to this. You can find our privacy policy here.