Corruption, Public Procurement, and the Budget Composition : Theory and Evidence from OECD Countries

Hessami, Zohal

Corruption, Public Procurement, and the Budget Composition : Theory and Evidence from OECD Countries

Dateien

Hessami_0-275534.pdfGröße: 536.6 KBDownloads: 399

Datum

2013

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Working Paper/Technical Report

Publikationsstatus

Published

Zusammenfassung

This paper examines the relationship between corruption and the composition of public expenditures. First, I derive a theoretical model that links the degree of corruption in a country - to be understood as the prevailing culture of corruption - to distortions in the budget composition. The transmission channel is a rent-seeking contest where firms from different sectors pay bribes to politicians and bureaucrats to influence public procurement decisions, which give rise to endogenous rents. I then test the implications of the theoretical model with a dataset covering 29 OECD countries over the 1996-2009 period. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the relative share of expenditures on categories that involve public procurement, high-technology goods, and non-competitive markets (health and environmental protection including waste management) increases with corruption. This distortion occurs at the expense of spending categories that do not involve public procurement (social protection and recretion, culture and religion).

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Corruption; rent-seeking; public procurement; budget composition

Zitieren

ISO 690

HESSAMI, Zohal, 2013. Corruption, Public Procurement, and the Budget Composition : Theory and Evidence from OECD Countries

BibTex

@techreport{Hessami2013Corru-29992,
  year={2013},
  series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics},
  title={Corruption, Public Procurement, and the Budget Composition : Theory and Evidence from OECD Countries},
  number={2013-27},
  author={Hessami, Zohal}
}

RDF

<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/29992">
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/29992/3/Hessami_0-275534.pdf"/>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/29992"/>
    <dcterms:title>Corruption, Public Procurement, and the Budget Composition : Theory and Evidence from OECD Countries</dcterms:title>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/29992/3/Hessami_0-275534.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-02-24T10:50:16Z</dcterms:available>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-02-24T10:50:16Z</dc:date>
    <dc:contributor>Hessami, Zohal</dc:contributor>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dc:creator>Hessami, Zohal</dc:creator>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This paper examines the relationship between corruption and the composition of public expenditures. First, I derive a theoretical model that links the degree of corruption in a country - to be understood as the prevailing culture of corruption - to distortions in the budget composition. The transmission channel is a rent-seeking contest where firms from different sectors pay bribes to politicians and bureaucrats to influence public procurement decisions, which give rise to endogenous rents. I then test the implications of the theoretical model with a dataset covering 29 OECD countries over the 1996-2009 period. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the relative share of expenditures on categories that involve public procurement, high-technology goods, and non-competitive markets (health and environmental protection including waste management) increases with corruption. This distortion occurs at the expense of spending categories that do not involve public procurement (social protection and recretion, culture and religion).</dcterms:abstract>
    <dcterms:issued>2013</dcterms:issued>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Universitätsbibliographie

Ja