@techreport{Martensen2014Oppos-30045,
  year={2014},
  series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics},
  title={Opposite Effects of Competition and Rents on Collective Bargaining : Evidence from Germany},
  number={2014-15},
  author={Martensen, Finn}
}

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    <dcterms:title>Opposite Effects of Competition and Rents on Collective Bargaining : Evidence from Germany</dcterms:title>
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    <dc:contributor>Martensen, Finn</dc:contributor>
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    <dc:creator>Martensen, Finn</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:issued>2014</dcterms:issued>
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    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Why do firms and workers bargain individually or collectively? I test the effect of product market competition and rents with German establishment data. Against intuition, competition and rents have opposite effects. Competition has a u-shaped effect on the probability of collective bargaining. This contradicts the existing theory (Ebell and Haefke 2006; Boeri and Burda 2009). By contrast, firms with higher rents are more prone to collective bargaining. For both competition and rents, the effect is stronger for sector-level than for firm-level collective bargaining. Indicators of higher productivity also matter: A higher export share drives firms into individual wage bargaining, while a higher share of workers with higher education drives firms into firm-level bargaining. Thus, the interplay between productivity, competition, and the wage setting regime is much more subtle than suggested by the existing theory.</dcterms:abstract>
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