@techreport{LeBlanc2015Optim-32696,
  year={2015},
  series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics},
  title={Optimal Savings for Retirement : The Role of Individual Accounts},
  number={2015-10},
  author={Le Blanc, Julia and Scholl, Almuth}
}

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    <dc:contributor>Le Blanc, Julia</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:title>Optimal Savings for Retirement : The Role of Individual Accounts</dcterms:title>
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    <dc:creator>Scholl, Almuth</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Le Blanc, Julia</dc:creator>
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    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We employ a life-cycle model with income risk to analyze how tax-deferred individual accounts affect households' savings for retirement. We consider voluntary accounts as opposed to mandatory accounts with minimum contribution rates. We contrast add-on accounts with carve-out accounts that partly replace social security contributions. Quantitative results suggest that making add-on accounts mandatory has adverse welfare effects across income groups. Carve-out accounts generate positive welfare across all income groups but gains are lower for low income earners. Default investment rules in individual accounts have a modest impact on welfare.</dcterms:abstract>
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